BA governance health: F (severe)
BA — 17 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Breaking & High-Priority Signals
AMZN governance health: F (severe)
AMZN — 17 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for AMZN: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BEN governance health: F (severe)
BEN — 17 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for BEN: 0.20/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BAC governance health: F (severe)
BAC — 17 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BA governance health: F (severe)
BA — 16 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BEN governance health: F (severe)
BEN — 16 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for BEN: 0.20/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BAC governance health: F (severe)
BAC — 16 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
AMZN governance health: F (severe)
AMZN — 16 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for AMZN: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BLK governance health: F (severe)
BLK — 17 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for BLK: 0.25/1.00 — severe concerns. Multiple adverse signals co-present within 365 days; elevated probability of activist intervention or board restructuring.
BLK governance health: F (severe)
BLK — 16 July 2026.
Composite governance health score for BLK: 0.25/1.00 — severe concerns. Multiple adverse signals co-present within 365 days; elevated probability of activist intervention or board restructuring.
Support for Charles Baker keeps sliding at UNH
UNH — 16 July 2026.
Director approval declining avg 5.1 pp/year over 3 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director Sandra O. Moose has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director Hugh B. Price has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director Frances Keeth has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director Ivan G. Seidenberg has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director John W. Snow has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director Donald T. Nicolaisen has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director Joseph Neubauer has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director John R. Stafford has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director Robert W. Lane has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
VZ: director_long_tenure signal detected
VZ — 17 July 2026.
Director Rodney E. Slater has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
RTX: director_long_tenure signal detected
RTX — 16 July 2026.
Director Charles R. Lee has served on the RTX board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-04-19). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
TGT: director_long_tenure signal detected
TGT — 16 July 2026.
Director Gregg W. Steinhafel has served on the TGT board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-10). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
TGT: director_long_tenure signal detected
TGT — 16 July 2026.
Director Anne M. Mulcahy has served on the TGT board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-10). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
TGT: director_long_tenure signal detected
TGT — 16 July 2026.
Director Calvin Darden has served on the TGT board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-10). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
TGT: director_long_tenure signal detected
TGT — 16 July 2026.
Director Stephen W. Sanger has served on the TGT board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-10). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
UNH: director_long_tenure signal detected
UNH — 16 July 2026.
Director Richard T. Burke has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
UNH: director_long_tenure signal detected
UNH — 16 July 2026.
Director Douglas W. Leatherdale has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
UNH: director_long_tenure signal detected
UNH — 16 July 2026.
Director Glenn M. Renwick has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
UNH: director_long_tenure signal detected
UNH — 16 July 2026.
Director Stephen J. Hemsley has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
UNH: director_long_tenure signal detected
UNH — 16 July 2026.
Director Michele J. Hooper has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
UNH: director_long_tenure signal detected
UNH — 16 July 2026.
Director Robert J. Darretta has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
UNH: director_long_tenure signal detected
UNH — 16 July 2026.
Director Rodger A. Lawson has served on the UNH board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-27). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA governance health: F (severe)
BA — 18 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
AMZN governance health: F (severe)
AMZN — 18 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for AMZN: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BAC governance health: F (severe)
BAC — 18 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BEN governance health: F (severe)
BEN — 18 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BEN: 0.20/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BEN governance health: F (severe)
BEN — 17 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BEN: 0.20/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BA governance health: F (severe)
BA — 17 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
AMZN: governance_peer_underperformer signal detected
AMZN — 17 July 2026.
AMZN governance health score 0.00 is 0.80 below the technology sector median (0.80 across 3 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
BA: governance_peer_underperformer signal detected
BA — 17 July 2026.
BA governance health score 0.00 is 0.36 below the industrial sector median (0.36 across 2 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
Equity Disclosure fails to win majority at SCHW
SCHW — 22 May 2023.
Director received only 24.4% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Retirement Benefits fails to win majority at BA
BA — 30 April 2013.
Director received only 29.7% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Written Consent fails to win majority at BA
BA — 30 April 2013.
Director received only 33.8% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Significant Stock fails to win majority at BA
BA — 30 April 2013.
Director received only 24.2% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Board Chairman fails to win majority at BA
BA — 30 April 2013.
Director received only 42.0% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Rights Code fails to win majority at BA
BA — 3 May 2011.
Director received only 6.9% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Political Activity fails to win majority at BA
BA — 3 May 2011.
Director received only 19.2% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Special Meetings fails to win majority at BA
BA — 3 May 2011.
Director received only 33.7% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Independent Chairman fails to win majority at BA
BA — 3 May 2011.
Director received only 35.0% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Association Contributions fails to win majority at BA
BA — 3 May 2012.
Director received only 25.7% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Former Executives fails to win majority at BA
BA — 3 May 2012.
Director received only 23.5% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
AMZN: governance_peer_underperformer signal detected
AMZN — 16 July 2026.
AMZN governance health score 0.00 is 0.80 below the technology sector median (0.80 across 3 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
BA: governance_peer_underperformer signal detected
BA — 16 July 2026.
BA governance health score 0.00 is 0.36 below the industrial sector median (0.36 across 2 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
MSTR: cfo_departure signal detected
MSTR — 6 July 2026.
CFO/Principal Financial Officer departure at MSTR (retirement, voluntary). CFO departures precede earnings restatements and guidance misses at elevated base rates. Monitor next earnings release closely.
BAC governance health: F (severe)
BAC — 8 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
BA governance health: F (severe)
BA — 8 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.12/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
CVLT: dividend_cut signal detected
CVLT — 17 June 2026.
CVLT reduced its dividend ($21.9300/share). Dividend cuts indicate deteriorating cash flow, rising leverage, or a strategic capital reallocation. Strong bearish divergence signal when paired with governance stress.
FSK: dividend_cut signal detected
FSK — 17 June 2026.
FSK reduced its dividend ($21.9300/share). Dividend cuts indicate deteriorating cash flow, rising leverage, or a strategic capital reallocation. Strong bearish divergence signal when paired with governance stress.
ADMA: dividend_cut signal detected
ADMA — 17 June 2026.
ADMA reduced its dividend ($21.9300/share). Dividend cuts indicate deteriorating cash flow, rising leverage, or a strategic capital reallocation. Strong bearish divergence signal when paired with governance stress.
BLK governance health: F (severe)
BLK — 18 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BLK: 0.25/1.00 — severe concerns. Multiple adverse signals co-present within 365 days; elevated probability of activist intervention or board restructuring.
BAC governance health: F (severe)
BAC — 17 June 2026.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.35/1.00 — severe concerns. Multiple adverse signals co-present within 365 days; elevated probability of activist intervention or board restructuring.
Support for Charles O. Rossotti keeps sliding at BAC
BAC — 17 June 2026.
Director approval declining avg 11.1 pp/year over 2 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Support for Frances H. Arnold keeps sliding at GOOG
GOOG — 17 June 2026.
Director approval declining avg 8.7 pp/year over 2 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
BLK: governance_deteriorating signal detected
BLK — 17 June 2026.
Governance health index for BLK deteriorated by 0.33 (0.66 → 0.33). Worsening governance trajectory; monitor for escalating activist risk.
CVX: director_long_tenure signal detected
CVX — 18 June 2026.
Director Votes S.H. Armacost has served on the CVX board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-02). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
HD: director_long_tenure signal detected
HD — 18 June 2026.
Director David H. Batchelder has served on the HD board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-25). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Mark A. Goldfarb draws 22% opposition at SCHW
SCHW — 18 May 2021.
Director approval at 78.0% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Ronald D. Sugar draws 31% opposition at AAPL
AAPL — 1 March 2013.
Director approval at 68.8% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Ronald Sugar draws 32% opposition at AAPL
AAPL — 5 March 2014.
Director approval at 67.7% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Anne M. Tatlock draws 32% opposition at BEN
BEN — 17 March 2011.
Director approval at 68.4% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Virgis W. Colbert draws 21% opposition at BAC
BAC — 9 May 2012.
Director approval at 78.8% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Charles O. Rossotti draws 31% opposition at BAC
BAC — 9 May 2012.
Director approval at 69.1% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Sharon L. Allen draws 28% opposition at BAC
BAC — 7 May 2015.
Director approval at 71.6% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Thomas J. May draws 34% opposition at BAC
BAC — 7 May 2015.
Director approval at 66.3% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Arthur D. Collins Jr. draws 41% opposition at BA
BA — 27 April 2020.
Director approval at 58.6% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Edmund P. Giambastiani Jr. draws 36% opposition at BA
BA — 27 April 2020.
Director approval at 63.7% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Lawrence W. Kellner draws 27% opposition at BA
BA — 27 April 2020.
Director approval at 73.2% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Susan C. Schwab draws 44% opposition at BA
BA — 27 April 2020.
Director approval at 56.4% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Ronald A. Williams draws 34% opposition at BA
BA — 27 April 2020.
Director approval at 66.5% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
David L. Calhoun draws 23% opposition at BA
BA — 17 May 2024.
Director approval at 76.9% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
David L. Joyce draws 34% opposition at BA
BA — 17 May 2024.
Director approval at 65.9% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
AMZN: governance_peer_underperformer signal detected
AMZN — 18 June 2026.
AMZN governance health score 0.00 is 0.80 below the technology sector median (0.80 across 3 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
AMZN: cfo_departure signal detected
AMZN — 22 March 2007.
CFO/Principal Financial Officer departure at AMZN (resignation, voluntary). CFO departures precede earnings restatements and guidance misses at elevated base rates. Monitor next earnings release closely.
AMZN: governance_deteriorating signal detected
AMZN — 8 June 2026.
Governance health index for AMZN deteriorated by 0.26 (0.64 → 0.38). Worsening governance trajectory; monitor for escalating activist risk.
Support for Thomas J. May keeps sliding at BAC
BAC — 8 June 2026.
Director approval declining avg 9.9 pp/year over 4 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Support for Sharon L. Allen keeps sliding at BAC
BAC — 8 June 2026.
Director approval declining avg 13.5 pp/year over 3 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Support for Susan C. Schwab keeps sliding at BA
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director approval declining avg 5.9 pp/year over 8 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Support for Arthur D. Collins Jr. keeps sliding at BA
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director approval declining avg 19.2 pp/year over 3 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
AMZN: director_long_tenure signal detected
AMZN — 8 June 2026.
Director Patricia Q. Stonesifer has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
AMZN: director_long_tenure signal detected
AMZN — 8 June 2026.
Director Thomas O. Ryder has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
AMZN: director_long_tenure signal detected
AMZN — 8 June 2026.
Director William B. Gordon has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
AMZN: director_long_tenure signal detected
AMZN — 8 June 2026.
Director Tom A. Alberg has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
AMZN: director_long_tenure signal detected
AMZN — 8 June 2026.
Director Jeffrey P. Bezos has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
AMZN: director_long_tenure signal detected
AMZN — 8 June 2026.
Director Seely Brown has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Samuel H. Armacost has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Chutta Ratnathicam has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Gregory E. Johnson has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Mark C. Pigott has served on the BEN board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Charles Crocker has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Thomas H. Kean has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Peter M. Sacerdote has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Joseph R. Hardiman has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Anne M. Tatlock has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Laura Stein has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Charles B. Johnson has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BEN: director_long_tenure signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
Director Geoffrey Y. Yang has served on the BEN board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA: director_long_tenure signal detected
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director John H. Biggs has served on the BA board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-04-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA: director_long_tenure signal detected
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director Rights Code has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA: director_long_tenure signal detected
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director John E. Bryson has served on the BA board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-04-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA: director_long_tenure signal detected
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director William M. Daley has served on the BA board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-04-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA: director_long_tenure signal detected
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director Executive Compensation has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA: director_long_tenure signal detected
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director Special Meetings has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA: director_long_tenure signal detected
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director Independent Chairman has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
BA: director_long_tenure signal detected
BA — 8 June 2026.
Director Political Activity has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
PLTR: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
PLTR — 15 May 2026.
5 distinct insiders at PLTR sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-11 (total value: $805704). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
PLTR: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
PLTR — 20 May 2026.
4 distinct insiders at PLTR sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-11 (total value: $526291). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
STT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
STT — 13 May 2026.
5 distinct insiders at STT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-11 (total value: $4905828). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
STT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
STT — 26 May 2026.
4 distinct insiders at STT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-11 (total value: $4830393). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
MSFT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
MSFT — 14 May 2026.
3 distinct insiders at MSFT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $10508461). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 15 May 2026.
7 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $298176770). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 21 May 2026.
6 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $298009558). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 22 May 2026.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $296149669). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 27 May 2026.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $219702510). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 28 May 2026.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $189441602). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
BEN: governance_peer_underperformer signal detected
BEN — 8 June 2026.
BEN governance health score 0.42 is 0.29 below the financial sector median (0.71 across 2 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
SCHW: insider_buy signal detected
SCHW — 28 May 2026.
Wurster Richard A (President & CEO) at SCHW purchased 21959 shares at $84.23/share (total $1849512) on 2026-05-28. Open-market insider buy — conviction signal.
NVDA: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
NVDA — 27 May 2026.
3 distinct insiders at NVDA sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-03 (total value: $114666313). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
META: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
META — 4 May 2026.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-01 (total value: $3744217). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
META: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
META — 11 May 2026.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-01 (total value: $3181450). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
META: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
META — 26 May 2026.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-01 (total value: $2621618). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
META: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
META — 27 May 2026.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-01 (total value: $2111902). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
META: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
META — 27 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-27 (total value: $3772880). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
META: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
META — 1 May 2026.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-27 (total value: $3151682). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 23 April 2026.
5 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-22 (total value: $81041248). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
JPM: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
JPM — 5 May 2026.
7 distinct insiders at JPM sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-20 (total value: $10208997). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
JPM: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
JPM — 15 May 2026.
4 distinct insiders at JPM sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-20 (total value: $6492571). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
JPM: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
JPM — 15 April 2026.
8 distinct insiders at JPM sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-15 (total value: $63867596). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 15 April 2026.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-15 (total value: $3985089). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 16 April 2026.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-15 (total value: $3818708). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
GS: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
GS — 17 April 2026.
5 distinct insiders at GS sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-14 (total value: $8016471). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
GS: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
GS — 23 April 2026.
5 distinct insiders at GS sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-14 (total value: $7640821). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
GS: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
GS — 1 May 2026.
4 distinct insiders at GS sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-14 (total value: $7097179). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
STT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
STT — 22 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at STT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-13 (total value: $2006915). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
META: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
META — 13 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-11 (total value: $3333022). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
META: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
META — 15 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-11 (total value: $3011763). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
AMZN: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
AMZN — 14 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-04 (total value: $23827502). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
AMZN: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
AMZN — 17 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-04 (total value: $18805002). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
AMZN: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
AMZN — 24 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-04 (total value: $10900002). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
AMZN: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
AMZN — 30 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-04 (total value: $9899262). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
AMZN: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
AMZN — 1 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-01 (total value: $15416202). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 24 March 2026.
5 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-23 (total value: $42814131). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 26 March 2026.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-23 (total value: $6209157). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
MS: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
MS — 16 April 2026.
3 distinct insiders at MS sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-20 (total value: $2765491). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
WMT: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
WMT — 19 March 2026.
5 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-16 (total value: $41847862). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
JPM: insider_sell_cluster signal detected
JPM — 23 March 2026.
9 distinct insiders at JPM sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-15 (total value: $55428215). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.