BA governance health: F (severe)
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
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Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for AMZN: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BEN: 0.20/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BEN: 0.20/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for AMZN: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BLK: 0.25/1.00 — severe concerns. Multiple adverse signals co-present within 365 days; elevated probability of activist intervention or board restructuring.
Composite governance health score for BLK: 0.25/1.00 — severe concerns. Multiple adverse signals co-present within 365 days; elevated probability of activist intervention or board restructuring.
Director approval declining avg 5.1 pp/year over 3 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Director Sandra O. Moose has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Hugh B. Price has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Frances Keeth has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Ivan G. Seidenberg has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director John W. Snow has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Donald T. Nicolaisen has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Joseph Neubauer has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director John R. Stafford has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Robert W. Lane has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Rodney E. Slater has served on the VZ board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-12). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Charles R. Lee has served on the RTX board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-04-19). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Gregg W. Steinhafel has served on the TGT board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-10). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Anne M. Mulcahy has served on the TGT board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-10). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Calvin Darden has served on the TGT board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-10). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Stephen W. Sanger has served on the TGT board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-10). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Richard T. Burke has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Douglas W. Leatherdale has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Glenn M. Renwick has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Stephen J. Hemsley has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Michele J. Hooper has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Robert J. Darretta has served on the UNH board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Rodger A. Lawson has served on the UNH board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-27). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for AMZN: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BEN: 0.20/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BEN: 0.20/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
AMZN governance health score 0.00 is 0.80 below the technology sector median (0.80 across 3 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
BA governance health score 0.00 is 0.36 below the industrial sector median (0.36 across 2 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
Director received only 24.4% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 29.7% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 33.8% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 24.2% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 42.0% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 6.9% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 19.2% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 33.7% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 35.0% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 25.7% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
Director received only 23.5% approval — below 50% majority threshold. Under majority voting standards the director must submit a resignation; board refusal to accept is a governance crisis indicator.
AMZN governance health score 0.00 is 0.80 below the technology sector median (0.80 across 3 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
BA governance health score 0.00 is 0.36 below the industrial sector median (0.36 across 2 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
CFO/Principal Financial Officer departure at MSTR (retirement, voluntary). CFO departures precede earnings restatements and guidance misses at elevated base rates. Monitor next earnings release closely.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.00/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
Composite governance health score for BA: 0.12/1.00 — CRITICAL. Severe concurrent governance failures within 365 days; activist intervention or forced board restructuring highly probable.
CVLT reduced its dividend ($21.9300/share). Dividend cuts indicate deteriorating cash flow, rising leverage, or a strategic capital reallocation. Strong bearish divergence signal when paired with governance stress.
FSK reduced its dividend ($21.9300/share). Dividend cuts indicate deteriorating cash flow, rising leverage, or a strategic capital reallocation. Strong bearish divergence signal when paired with governance stress.
ADMA reduced its dividend ($21.9300/share). Dividend cuts indicate deteriorating cash flow, rising leverage, or a strategic capital reallocation. Strong bearish divergence signal when paired with governance stress.
Composite governance health score for BLK: 0.25/1.00 — severe concerns. Multiple adverse signals co-present within 365 days; elevated probability of activist intervention or board restructuring.
Composite governance health score for BAC: 0.35/1.00 — severe concerns. Multiple adverse signals co-present within 365 days; elevated probability of activist intervention or board restructuring.
Director approval declining avg 11.1 pp/year over 2 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Director approval declining avg 8.7 pp/year over 2 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Governance health index for BLK deteriorated by 0.33 (0.66 → 0.33). Worsening governance trajectory; monitor for escalating activist risk.
Director Votes S.H. Armacost has served on the CVX board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-06-02). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director David H. Batchelder has served on the HD board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-25). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director approval at 78.0% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 68.8% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 67.7% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 68.4% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 78.8% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 69.1% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 71.6% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 66.3% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 58.6% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 63.7% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 73.2% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 56.4% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 66.5% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 76.9% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
Director approval at 65.9% is below the 85% friction threshold; may indicate activist targeting or board misalignment.
AMZN governance health score 0.00 is 0.80 below the technology sector median (0.80 across 3 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
CFO/Principal Financial Officer departure at AMZN (resignation, voluntary). CFO departures precede earnings restatements and guidance misses at elevated base rates. Monitor next earnings release closely.
Governance health index for AMZN deteriorated by 0.26 (0.64 → 0.38). Worsening governance trajectory; monitor for escalating activist risk.
Director approval declining avg 9.9 pp/year over 4 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Director approval declining avg 13.5 pp/year over 3 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Director approval declining avg 5.9 pp/year over 8 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Director approval declining avg 19.2 pp/year over 3 data points. Continued trend suggests replacement within 12-18 months.
Director Patricia Q. Stonesifer has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Thomas O. Ryder has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director William B. Gordon has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Tom A. Alberg has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Jeffrey P. Bezos has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Seely Brown has served on the AMZN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-05-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Samuel H. Armacost has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Chutta Ratnathicam has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Gregory E. Johnson has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Mark C. Pigott has served on the BEN board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Charles Crocker has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Thomas H. Kean has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Peter M. Sacerdote has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Joseph R. Hardiman has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Anne M. Tatlock has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Laura Stein has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Charles B. Johnson has served on the BEN board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Geoffrey Y. Yang has served on the BEN board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-03-17). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director John H. Biggs has served on the BA board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-04-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Rights Code has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director John E. Bryson has served on the BA board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-04-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director William M. Daley has served on the BA board for approximately 16 years (since 2010-04-28). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Executive Compensation has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Special Meetings has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Independent Chairman has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
Director Political Activity has served on the BA board for approximately 15 years (since 2011-05-03). Directors with >12-year tenure may lack independence per ISS/Glass Lewis standards; proxy advisors increasingly vote against long-tenured directors.
5 distinct insiders at PLTR sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-11 (total value: $805704). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at PLTR sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-11 (total value: $526291). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
5 distinct insiders at STT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-11 (total value: $4905828). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at STT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-11 (total value: $4830393). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at MSFT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $10508461). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
7 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $298176770). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
6 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $298009558). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $296149669). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $219702510). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-10 (total value: $189441602). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
BEN governance health score 0.42 is 0.29 below the financial sector median (0.71 across 2 peers). Sector-relative underperformance amplifies activist targeting risk.
Wurster Richard A (President & CEO) at SCHW purchased 21959 shares at $84.23/share (total $1849512) on 2026-05-28. Open-market insider buy — conviction signal.
3 distinct insiders at NVDA sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-03 (total value: $114666313). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-01 (total value: $3744217). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-01 (total value: $3181450). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-01 (total value: $2621618). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-06-01 (total value: $2111902). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-27 (total value: $3772880). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-27 (total value: $3151682). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
5 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-22 (total value: $81041248). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
7 distinct insiders at JPM sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-20 (total value: $10208997). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at JPM sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-20 (total value: $6492571). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
8 distinct insiders at JPM sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-15 (total value: $63867596). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-15 (total value: $3985089). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-15 (total value: $3818708). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
5 distinct insiders at GS sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-14 (total value: $8016471). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
5 distinct insiders at GS sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-14 (total value: $7640821). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at GS sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-14 (total value: $7097179). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at STT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-13 (total value: $2006915). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-11 (total value: $3333022). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at META sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-11 (total value: $3011763). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-04 (total value: $23827502). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-04 (total value: $18805002). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-04 (total value: $10900002). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-04 (total value: $9899262). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at AMZN sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-05-01 (total value: $15416202). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
5 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-23 (total value: $42814131). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
4 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-23 (total value: $6209157). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
3 distinct insiders at MS sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-20 (total value: $2765491). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
5 distinct insiders at WMT sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-16 (total value: $41847862). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.
9 distinct insiders at JPM sold shares within a 30-day window ending 2026-04-15 (total value: $55428215). Coordinated insider selling can precede negative disclosures or reflect broad insider pessimism.